ABSTRACT
replaced by market-based methods for day-ahead allocation in July 2004
1 . These are flowbased zonal methods 2 which can rely on two types of auction mechanism: the implicit auction and the explicit auction 3 .
The first auction mechanism is called "implicit" as the available transmission capacities are implicitly taken into account by the market operator in the selection of energy offers. It is a pricing mechanism derived from the early work on nodal pricing by Bohn, Caramanis and Schweppe (1984) and Hogan (1992) . The implicit auction is currently applied in Europe to allocate transmission capacity among the Nordic countries 4 (known as the "market splitting" method 5 ), in the trilateral coupling of the Netherlands, Belgium and France (TLC), in the MIBEL market covering the Iberian Peninsula, and within the Italian market which is splitted into several internal zones. It already reflects a certain degree of integration, and is particularly appropriate for day-ahead capacity rights, since the flow is based on the dayahead market data from two interconnected markets. However the main argument against this method in the European context is that the meshing of the continental grid makes market splitting, as well as other related methods, inapplicable without the merger of power exchanges, which is quite unrealistic from an institutional and political point of view. As Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) explain, the existing differences in the architecture of electricity markets in European neighbouring countries (including pool structure as well as bilateral markets now in place and the wide diversity of market rules) render integration currently difficult if not impossible. Hence, the existence of various system operators, each responsible for one control area, politically and institutionally constrains the generalization of the implementation of the implicit auction. Finally, it is worth noting that there are also technical obstacles, but these are beyond the scope of this paper. The only feasible and plausible solution in the short term is thus to link zonal markets, but that is not conducive to integration and the creation of the IEM.
In the second auction mechanism, called the explicit auction mechanism, transmission capacities are auctioned separately and before the allocation of wholesale energy. Explicit 1 For an overview of the current cross-border congestion management methods in Europe, cf. ETSO (2006) .
2 Flow-based methods use the so-called power transfer distribution factors (PTDF) to convert the commercial exchanges into their physical influence on the cross-border flow. Another aspect of these methods, which cannot be considered within the scope of this paper, is that they convert bottlenecks or border capacities into physical limitations of those flows.
3 For a review of congestion management methods, see De Vries (2004) . 4 Denmark (west and east), Finland, Sweden and Norway. 5 The market-splitting approach assumes an existing integrated market where injections and withdrawals of several nodes are assigned to a specific zone (so that there is only one energy price per zone).
auctions are increasingly used among European countries (ETSO, 2006) . They are particularly appropriate for the allocation of long-term capacity rights (sold at yearly or monthly auctions). In practical terms, they do not require a single power exchange as in the case of the implicit auction. However, as in California, it is up to the system operator to coordinate the physics of the problem after transmission and generation contracts have been signed ex ante by all the private scheduling coordinators. This coordination problem between system operators is typically not taken into account in the explicit auction mechanism, and therefore does not favour market integration. The so-called "explicit coordinated auction" mechanism has been proposed by European system operators precisely to offset this lack of coordination in the case of cross-border flows.
The spirit of the "coordinated explicit auction" mechanism was initially proposed by the Florence Regulatory Forum established in 1999. It was seen as a way to overcome political and institutional obstacles to coordination and integration of European markets. This mechanism was subsequently adopted by the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) in 2001. In the ETSO's proposal, the auction is coordinated, in the sense that, instead of having an auction for transmission capacity at each cross-border zone (with the various system operators in charge of coordinating the physics), the transmission capacities are all auctioned off in the same process (especially across zones characterized by strong loop flows). In other words, the available transmission capacities are all covered by a single auction. At the individual level, this centralized mechanism should limit uncertainties over the allocation and prices of transmission rights, and therefore reduce the risk of productive inefficiencies. At the aggregate level, a better coordination between zones should enable a better allocation of transmission capacity (and a better estimation of capacities that could be auctioned in a secure and reliable way). Overall, the aim of this proposal is to achieve the full potential of the existing European interconnected network, through an adequate cross-border congestion management scheme, while each area may keep its own rules to manage its internal problems. In a nutshell, this solution seems to be more "institutionally friendly".! Since the ETSO's proposal, the efficiency conditions of the implementation of the coordinated auction mechanism in Europe has been studied. However, it has not yet achieved political or scientific consensus, and discussions are still on-going regarding both its efficiency in managing cross-border congestions and its properties in terms of European market integration. For instance, the Third Legislative Package approved in April 2009 recommends use of the coordinated mechanism notably for long-and medium-term allocation (EU, 2009) 6 . Our contribution seeks to participate in the on-going debate on cross-border management solutions and to further investigate the efficiency of the coordinated auction mechanism.
From a theoretical point of view, under the assumption of benevolent generators that truthfully reveal their marginal costs, it is demonstrated that both mechanisms -the coordinated explicit auction and the implicit auction -should lead to: (i) an efficient allocation of available transmission capacity, and (ii) an efficient production in which the least-cost generation units are successively required to produce, given the capacity constraints of the network. However, as Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2005) point out, this analysis is based on perfect and rational individual expectations, which is a strong behavioural hypothesis.
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) emphasize how the perfect anticipation assumption strongly constrains the model, while the aggregation of the network limits the results (to keep traders from investigating the intricacies of the electrical network).
From an empirical point of view, the international experiences of a separation of the energy and transmission markets underlying coordinated auction have raised some doubts about its efficiency (Ehrenmann, Smeers 2005) , while the coordinated explicit auction -as proposed by ETSO -has never been applied. Consequently, there is a lack of data to be able to assess its efficiency.
In this article we use the experimental methodology to collect data enabling us to assess whether and how the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction mechanism succeed in efficiently allocating scarce transmission capacity, while reducing generators' ability to exercise market power. Part of our contribution is methodological: in the laboratory setting we recreate a reasonable level of complexity enabling us to analyze in depth the two market mechanisms currently used or under scrutiny in Europe. We construct an experimental environment, using smart computer-assisted markets with a three-node network and its consequential constraints like loop flows and congestions, including the stochastic nature of the loads on the lines, the associated need to respect the physical constraints in the network, and the location variability of transmission losses. Our experimental design reproduces an industry structure akin to the current one in Continental Europe: a competitive oligopoly where major players are emerging, each of which is relying on a geographical stronghold and is present both at the production and at the supply level. Actually, in Europe there are neither "pure" generators nor "pure" suppliers in the electricity industry. 7 We reproduce these individual characteristics in our experimental design by endowing "generators/suppliers" with both supply and demand functions which implicitly define individual net positions in each market as net buyer or net seller.
We examine the effects of the two auction mechanisms -the implicit auction and the coordinated auction -on the pattern of both energy prices and capacity prices, and on the transit volume. Our main result highlights the superiority of the implicit auction mechanism over the coordinated explicit auctions. The coordinated explicit auction is inefficient in terms of global efficiency, and in terms of allocation of transmission capacity. Energy prices are highly volatile in the coordinated auction treatment and the transmission capacities are inefficiently used.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we present the experimental design and procedure, i.e. the characteristics of the electric power network (nodes, transmission capacity and power flows), the characteristics of the market participants (portfolio of generation units, individual supply and demand functions, and localization in the network), and the market institutions (the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction). In Section 3, we present our results on the global efficiency of the two auction mechanisms, the patterns of market prices for transmission capacity and energy, and the management of congestions.
Section 4 concludes.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Our experimental design seeks to represent the main features of the continental european market, in a laboratory setting. In terms of market structure, the experiment reproduces the same magnitude of market shares of continental european generators, and their localization in the network, which together characterize potential market power. The network configuration reproduces the existence of capacity limitations, but we do not take the intracountry situations into account (in particular, we do not consider internal congestions). We first present the electric power network, and then turn to the description of the two market mechanisms. The market structure in the experiments consists of 4 generators (G1 through G4 in Figure 1 ), unevenly located in the network. Generator G1 is dominant at node A, while generator G4 is dominant at node C, and generators G2 and G3 are together dominant at node B. At each node, a generator is endowed with an individual supply function and an individual demand function. These demand and supply functions are designed in order to model individual willingness to buy or to sell energy in the three different markets. The inverse demand function gives the limit price under which a generator is willing to buy energy.
Symmetrically, the inverse supply function gives the limit price above which the generator is willing to sell energy. Limit prices reflect the opportunity cost for using production facilities and the commitment to a must-serve demand. For instance, a generator with a must-serve demand constraint is a potential buyer in the market at any price below its own production cost. Symmetrically, a generator with an excess of production capacity is a potential seller at any price above its production cost. Demand and supply functions are reproduced in the experiment according to the redemption-value theory principle (Smith, 1976) . Accordingly, a generator in the laboratory is informed about the value (redemption value) it receives for each unit it buys and the value (marginal cost) it supports for each unit it sells. Table 2 reproduces as an example the redemption values and marginal costs of Generator 1 at node B. The market demand and supply for energy at each node is the aggregation of individual demand and supply functions. The market demand is cyclic, from both an individual and an aggregate point of view with two levels, namely the peak-load and base-load levels 8 .
Aggregate demand and supply at each node for, respectively, peak-load and base-load levels are described in Figures 2 and 3. 8 This specification aims at reproducing in a simple way two characteristics of electricity demand: variability and cyclic variation. It is a simplification of the typical daily load curve that exists in reality with two higherlevel periods (between 7.00 and 9.00a.m. and 5.00 and 7.00p.m.) and two lower-level periods (between 3.00 and 6.00a.m. and 9.00 and 12.00a.m.). The optimal flows in the network and the competitive equilibrium market prices in these two situations are described in Figure 4 below. These equilibrium prices are computed under the assumption that at each node each generator submits its limit prices to buy and sell. For base-load and peak-load periods, we compute the maximum global surplus by summing the four generators' profits plus the congestion rent at the equilibrium. The value of the maximum global surplus is 5,170 ECU for base-load periods and 2,830 for peak-load periods 9 .
Finally, the information released to all participants during the course of the experiment concerns the basic characteristics of the network, that is, the PTDF-matrix and the maximum capacity of each line (both held constant across sessions), the market prices at each node, as well as the flows on each line as an historical informational feedback.
The market institutions
In the following subsections we present the two alternative market institutions, namely, the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction, as we modelled them in the lab. The central feature of the auctions that we want to test is the sequence of events:
simultaneity of allocation of transmission capacity and energy in the implicit auction versus the sequential allocation of transmission capacity and energy in the explicit auction. We provide rationale in the section for the structures of energy markets and identify which features of the market are going to be tested.
The implicit auction
The implicit auction consists in simultaneously allocating transmission and energy capacities, in respectively a centralized and a decentralized way. Figure 5 represents the sequence of events and the information structure for the implicit auction.
Participants may submit offers to either sell or buy units of electricity. Each offer is made for a dedicated node, and is composed of a unit price/quantity pair. We use an optimization algorithm to determine the set of offers that maximizes the total surplus, and that is compatible with two constraints: (i) the aggregate supply must equal the aggregate demand of the whole system, and (ii) the transmission constraints (capacities, flows and loop-flows) have to be respected 10 . In practice, this implies that some offers that would have been retained without any congestion are finally not accepted; while others that were too high to be retained at first glance will finally be accepted. Energy prices at each node are obtained using the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization program. The bidding constraints associated with the congested transmission line give the price of the congestion. The marginal price of electricity at each node is then inferred from this price through the PTDF-matrix 11 .
Each generator receives private information concerning the acceptance rate of each of its offers, along with public information about the price at each node and the flows on each line. The profits of a generator for a period equal the sum of the profits it is making at each node. At a given node, its profits correspond to the sum of the redemption values of the units it owns and the revenue from the units it has sold.
The coordinated explicit auction
One of the main features of the coordinated explicit auction is that it affords any generator in a given power network the opportunity to buy and sell energy at each node of the 11 The calculation of the energy prices from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian of the maximization program is detailed in Appendix 1. wishes to sell at a node where it is not present, is to have bought the corresponding transmission capacity to transport energy to this node prior to the energy auction. Figure 6 represents the sequence of events in the coordinated explicit auction, as modelled in the experiment. The coordinated explicit auction is a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, a uniformprice auction is organized for the allocation of the sole transmission capacity between nodes in the network. In the second stage, an energy market opens at each node. These energy markets at each node work independently of one another, using a uniform-price mechanism to equilibrate the corresponding nodal market supply and demand. In other words, this second stage works as a procurement auction, run to allocate the right to inject energy into or withdraw it from the network.
A crucial characteristic of the coordinated explicit auction considered in the ETSO proposal is the "must use" attribute of the capacity allocated to a generator. In the capacity allocation stage, generators bid for "obligations" rather than "options" to use transmission capacity. Obligations are needed to allocate the maximum transmission capacity of a line individually penalized if the flows that they have generated do not correspond to the transmission capacity that they acquired in the first stage, i.e. if they use more or fewer capacity than they previously bought 13 . A generator which fails to use the transmission capacity allocated to it for the period is penalized through high production costs at the node where it should have had injected energy, and a zero redemption value at the node where it should have withdrawn energy. This acts as a penalty high enough to discourage such a behaviour.
Stage I: Auction for transmission capacity
The first stage of the coordinated explicit auction is the allocation of the existing transmission capacity. The participants bid to buy only transmission capacity that are sold by a factitious central auction house on the basis of the information given by the transmission system operators. At this stage, each participant is allowed to submit bids to buy a right to use transmission capacity from one node to another node for one period. The proposal is thus defined by the injection node, the withdrawal node, the amount of energy units transmitted, and the per-transmission-capacity unit price. The bidders identify the line as well as the direction of the flow.
The auction for transmission capacity ends before the starting of the auction for energy.
Consequently, the bids for transmission capacity depend on the market participants' anticipations of energy market prices.
To allocate transmission capacity, a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is used. Given the received bids, and taking into account the network constraints, the central auctioneer determines which bids will be accepted and the price paid for them. The selection of the bids and the determination of the equilibrium price result from the maximization of the profits from the auction under the transmission constraints. The transmission capacity should be 12 The netting of the flows is automatically taken into account in the implicit auction through the optimization program and the PTDF. Since in the explicit auctions the market participants bid for transmission capacities for one zone to another, we have to assume that they bid for obligations so that they can use the same amount of capacity as with the implicit auction. Otherwise the implicit auction would de facto be more efficient than the explicit one.
13 For example, a generator who has bought capacities to transport units from zone A to zone C has to inject -to produce or to buy -the adequate quantity in zone A at any cost, and to withdraw -to sell or use -the same amount in zone C even if it yields zero revenue. At the extreme, to respect transmission commitment, the generator who failed to buy the adequate quantity at the exportation zone could suffer important production costs with no revenue in return. it is paid for its transmission. If the allocation implies no congestion, no generator is charged for the capacity allocated.
Stage II: Auction for energy
The second stage consists of three independent and simultaneous energy markets, one for each node. Generators are allowed to participate in the three auctions simultaneously.
However, they expose themselves to considerable costs if they do not own the corresponding 14 The bidding process and the optimization program are set out in Appendix 2. 15 The calculation of prices for transmission right from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian of the maximization program is detailed in Appendix 2. transmission capacity for the unit that they are selling in any market where they are not present. This design features aims at capturing the "must-use" rule. 
RESULTS
The experiments were run in the experimental laboratories of the GATE (Lyon) and of the GAEL (Grenoble), using a dedicated market software developed with the experimental software Regate, the Internet-Based Software for Experimental Economics of the GATE (Zeiliger 2000). Undergraduate students were recruited from a business school, an engineering school and economic departments of the universities of the two locations.
Given the relative complexity of the experimental design, we organized each experimental session over two days, lasting two and a half hours on each day. The first day, students were taught the rules and trained with the instructions. The second day, they participated in the experimental session itself, taking the results into account for the payment.
The data and results reported below were collected from these second-day sessions.
In the lab, the duration of one period of an implicit session is shorter than one period of an explicit session 17 . This explains why the number of periods per session collected for the explicit treatment in our early experiments was lower than for the implicit treatment. In order to control for this difference, we conducted four additional explicit treatment sessions with extended sessions lasting at least 20 periods. Finally, we ran sixteen sessions in total, using the two market mechanisms as treatment variables. We have six independent findings for the implicit mechanism and ten for the explicit mechanism (see Table 3 ). Subjects were paid a !20 fixed payment for the "learning session" and, on average, !26 for the "data session". We report our results as a series of five findings, one related to the global efficiency of the system (i.e. the evaluation of the global surplus) and four concerning the economic performance of each auction design in terms of energy prices and flows.
Global efficiency
The efficiency is equal to the ratio of the observed global surplus and the theoretical maximum global surplus. For the implicit treatment, we calculated the global surplus by summing the four generators' profits plus the congestion rents in the implicit treatment. In the explicit treatment, the global surplus is the sum of the four generators' profits plus revenues 17 A period of coordinated explicit auction with a sequence of two interdependent auctions takes more time than a period of implicit auction with a single auction.
obtained from the sale of transmission rights. We observe extensive individual losses during some periods conducted under the explicit treatment. In order not to sidestep the analysis in favour of the implicit treatment, we decided to reduce negative efficiency rates to zero.
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the average global efficiency, and the minimum and maximum levels observed by treatment.
We present the results in two graphs: the first one is based on the sessions lasting 14 periods, while the second one is based on the sessions lasting at least 24 periods 18 . 18 Although all sessions lasted for at least 14 periods, only 9 lasted for 24 periods. These longer sessions represent a reduced sub-sample of our observations and should therefore be treated apart.
The implicit auction appears as the most efficient mechanism (Fig. 7) . For the sessions conducted under the implicit treatment, efficiency increases rapidly and remains close to the 90% level. Overall, we observe only 5 periods, out of the 166 periods collected, which have a zero or negative efficiency rate whereas for 38 periods the efficiency rate is over 95%. In the sessions of the explicit treatment, the observed efficiency rate is significantly lower and erratic (especially for the session lasting over 24 periods). Negative global surplus and zero efficiency are even observed in 25 of the 187 periods collected. The mean efficiency rate for the coordinated explicit auction treatment over all the periods is 50% whereas the figure obtained for the implicit auction treatment is 81%.
Finding 1: The implicit auction is more efficient than the coordinated explicit auction.
Evidence:
In all sessions and all periods taken together, the mean global efficiency for the implicit treatment is 81% against 50% for the explicit treatment.
• In the implicit auction treatment, the global surplus increases with the number of periods, which suggests that generators are learning how to be more efficient. Furthermore, the efficiency is higher for peak periods.
• In the coordinated explicit treatment the evolution of the efficiency rate is erratic and it is not possible to conclude on any learning effect, even when taking into account the session with up to 24 periods.
We use the following linear panel data model as the basis for a quantitative support to Finding 1. The model explains the efficiency of a session as a function notably of the level of demand and the dynamic convergence toward 100% efficiency. The sixteen independent sessions are modelled as random effects . Table 4 reports the estimateS of the linear model for efficiency. The coordinated explicit treatment significantly contributes to reducing the efficiency. The loss of efficiency is estimated at 32%. The efficiency observed in peak-load periods is significantly greater than that observed in base-load periods (10.6%). Efficiency increases significantly as the periods are repeated. This could be interpreted as a learning dynamic. Learning is nevertheless minimal compared to the efficiency gap between coordinated explicit and implicit auction.
Even in this experimental environment favourable to learning (at least 24 periods), it could take very long before explicit auctions become as efficient as implicit auctions. Note that the experimental environment is particularly favourable for learning as all variables are stable from one period to another. We can anticipate that observations under a more unstable environment would reinforce our conclusion about the superiority of the implicit treatment for efficiency.
These differences in efficiency between the two treatments can be explained by the joint effect of two factors: the evolution and convergence of energy prices (3.2) and the flows between nodes (3.3). We will now analyze these two effects separately.
Energy prices
The market prices observed at each node are compared to the competitive equilibrium (CE) price computed when assuming that each generator offers energy at a price equal to its marginal value with the implicit treatment. Average distance from CE prices and standard deviations by period and by treatment are represented in Figures 9, 10 for node A, 11 and 12
for node B and 13 and 14 for node C, for the 14 firsts periods with all the sessions. The differences between treatments are unambiguous. The dispersion of energy prices and the volatility of prices from period to period rapidly decrease in the implicit auction sessions: there is a strong convergence toward a single, specific price at each node. We find higher price dispersion between sessions with the coordinated explicit auction and higher volatility from period to period in each session. To assess quantitatively the evolution and convergence of market prices, we use a convergence model inspired by Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) for data collected with the implicit auction treatment 20 .
where is the average price of session i for period t and a dummy variable which takes the value one for session i and zero otherwise. This model is relevant to estimate the convergence process which could occur in a market experiment. Even if each session has its own starting point, they should converge -if a convergence occurs -to the same ultimate point. The model is estimated as a linear panel data model and the six independent sessions are modelled as random effects . We estimate the model for the price of each node, distinguishing between base-load and peak-load periods. As the prices observed at the beginning of each session are not really relevant to our analysis, we focus our presentation on price convergence 21 . Table 5 reports the estimates for for each node and for base-load and peak-load periods. 20 The price dynamics for the coordinated explicit auction treatments do not fit the assumption of this model. As a result, we cannot conduct the same analysis for the data collected in this treatment. 21 The complete results of the estimation are available upon request.
Energy prices observed with the implicit treatment converge towards a single equilibrium price for each node and for each demand level. The estimated prices of convergence are statistically significant and have a small standard deviation. The price of convergence for node A and base-load periods equals 59.7 and is significantly higher than the competitive market price of 50. Likewise, the price of convergence for node C and base-load periods equals 102.1, that is, less than the competitive market price of 108. These observations suggest the use of market power from generator G1 at node A and generator G4 at node C. Apart from these two situations, the observed market prices converge to the competitive market price. generators cannot correctly assess the inter-node market price differences, and therefore can hardly bid appropriately during the transmission auction. As a consequence, the energy price instability leads to a misallocation of transmission capacity.
Flows, congestions and transmission prices
Given the market structure at each node and maximum capacities for each line, line AC appears as the critical resource in the search for the optimal energy allocation through the three-node network. We can therefore expect permanent congestion on this line with an efficient allocation of transmission capacity. Rates of congestion reported in Tables 6 and 7 show a significant difference in the allocation of transmission capacity between sessions with implicit auction and with coordinated explicit auction. We observe that transmission lines are saturated with both mechanisms especially during peak-load periods when the demand on the network is greater. During base-load periods, for the critical line AC, congestion is observed in almost every period in the implicit treatment. In the explicit treatment, congestion rate of line AC is above 75%. The capacity of line AC is thus not fully allocated for one period out of four. These results show that, under explicit treatment, there is an under-use of the network, with inadequate flows and at least efficiency waste.
Finding 5. Transmission prices exhibit high dispersion throughout the repetition of periods in the coordinated explicit auction sessions
The price dispersion between and within sessions is such that a structured analysis of the price convergence cannot be used. We thus restrict our study to a descriptive analysis. Table 8 reports price levels and dispersions in high-demand and low-demand periods. We find that prices are lower than competitive equilibrium prices for transmission capacity at each node and for both base-load and peak-load periods. This result is a direct 
CONCLUSION
Using the experimental methodology in the laboratory setting, we tested and compared the efficiency of two alternative cross-border congestion management methods for electricity networks. Compared to the implicit mechanism, the coordinated explicit auction reveals its relative inefficiency in the laboratory, with mispricing and misallocation through the sequence of auctions. This is due to the necessary "must use it" rule: once bought, the transmission capacities have to be used otherwise there is a high penalty. Given this rule, a generator could have the incentive to sell energy at a very low price or to buy energy at a very high price to be able to meet its commitment. Price volatility on energy markets is an immediate consequence of the "must use rule" that makes it difficult for generators to accurately assess the inter-node market price differences, and therefore to bid efficiently during the transmission auction. It can consequently destabilize cross-border flows compared to the optimum flows and in return, destabilize the energy markets.
Our results provide evidence that the implicit auction is more efficient than the coordinated explicit auction for the allocation of both transmission capacity and energy. They contribute to the current discussions on cross-border congestion methods. They show that even in a simple environment such as the one we created in the laboratory, subjects are not able to correctly anticipate what will happen in the energy markets with the coordinated explicit auction, and therefore do not individually take the right decisions in the capacity market.
One explanation for this difference is the level of individual expectations that a subject needs in the experiment. In the coordinated explicit auction, individuals have to form expectations about both the transmission prices and the three energy market prices. The transmission prices depend on individual expectations about future energy prices, and in a repeated environment the energy prices in turn affect expectations about future individual decisions on transmission capacity. Overall, in the laboratory setting, the experiment reveals that even in longer sessions, individuals are constantly learning throughout the repetition of periods, collectively experiencing a "trial and error process" regarding their expectations of others' behaviors. The laboratory experiments suggest that the learning process is long and demanding at the individual level. Complementary results using simulation models on a much longer timeline should help to shed light on the timing of the learning process. Our findings furthermore suggest the need to design and add rules to accelerate the learning process and thereby improve the efficiency of the coordinated explicit auction. We suggest that the addition of a secondary market on transmission capacity would operate as a way to price and value individual and collective over-investment or under-investment in transmission capacity.
Another suggestion would be to add the possibilities to sell or to buy back transmission capacity to/from the system operator, adding a price corridor for transmission capacity to buy or to sell in order to give generators the financial incentives to do so. Allocations and prices are determined according to the following optimization process.
Constraint (1) indicates that offers can be either accepted or refused, partly or entirely.
Constraint (2) indicates that the total supply has to equal the total demand. Constraints ( 
MECHANISM
For each period, each generator has the opportunity to submit a set of bids to buy transmission rights on the three lines of the network. A bid to buy a transmission right is a price-quantity ordered pair such that is a bid to buy of one generator for a transmission right from node X to node Y, the per unit maximum price that generator agrees to pay, and the transmission capacity from node X to node Y that he requests. We also assume that . The outcome of the allocation process is , the transmission capacity units allocated to the bid to buy , and the price for the transmission capacity rights. The 
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